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Abstract:  With fixed costs of participating in the stock market, consumers with high
income will participate in the stock market, but consumers with lower income will not
participate.  If a fully-funded defined-contribution social security system tries to exploit
the equity premium by selling a dollar of bonds per capita and buying a dollar of equity
per capita, consumers who save but do not participate in the stock market will increase
their consumption, thereby reducing saving and capital accumulation. Calibration of a
general equilibrium model indicates that this policy could reduce the aggregate capital
stock substantially, by about 50 cents per capita.
                                                          
* This paper previously circulated under the title “The Aggregate Effects of Including Equities in the Social
Security Trust Fund.” I thank Bill Dupor, Janice Eberly, Doug Elmendorf, Martin Feldstein, Robert Hall,
Adriano Rampini, Matthew Shapiro, Nick Souleles, Stephen Zeldes, an anonymous referee and the
participants in the 1998 NBER Summer Institute Conference on Risk and Distribution Issues in Social
Security Reform, the EFG Program Meeting of the NBER, the International Workshop on Reforming Social
Security, and seminars at the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Princeton University, and the
University of Virginia for helpful comments.1
The Social Security system in the United States currently runs a surplus of $100
billion per year, which is used to buy bonds that are held in the Social Security Trust
Fund.  The value of this trust fund is projected to grow to more than $2.3 trillion 1999
dollars in the year 2015.  However, as the baby boom generation retires and collects
social security benefits, the trust fund will be drawn down until it is exhausted in 2034.
1
Various sorts of policies could delay, perhaps indefinitely, the date at which the
trust fund is exhausted.  Social security taxes could be increased by increasing payroll tax
rates or increasing the retirement age, and future benefits could be reduced explicitly or
more subtly by changing the calculation of the CPI, taxing future benefits more heavily,
increasing the retirement age, or adopting means testing.  However, policies to increase
social security taxes are opposed by workers, and policies to reduce social security
benefits are opposed by social security beneficiaries, both current and future.  A third type
of policy that neither directly increases taxes nor reduces benefits is to try to earn a higher
rate of return on the Social Security Trust Fund by taking advantage of the equity
premium on stocks relative to bonds.  Historically, the rate of return on stocks has
exceeded the rate of return on short-term riskless bills by an average of about 6% per
year.  The prospect of earning a higher rate of return on even a fraction of the huge Social
Security Trust Fund has generated a variety of proposals to invest some of the trust fund
in equity.
Some economists have argued that investing part of the Social Security Trust
Fund in equity is simply a rearrangement of paper assets without any real allocational
                                                          
1 These figures, which are from the intermediate projection in Table III.B2 of the 1999 Annual Report of
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust
Funds, refer to the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds.2
effects, and they have described such a policy as a “shell game.”  The shell game
argument is similar to the Ricardian equivalence proposition in public finance and
macroeconomics and the Modigliani-Miller theorem in corporate finance.  The argument
is that private investors will react to any rearrangement of the social security system’s
portfolio in a way that completely neutralizes the effect of the portfolio change.  For
example, if the social security system sells a dollar of bonds and purchases a dollar of
equity, private investors would buy a dollar of bonds and sell a dollar of equity.  There
would be no effect on asset prices or on the integrated portfolio of the private sector and
the social security system.  Like the Ricardian Equivalence proposition and the
Modigliani-Miller theorem, the shell game argument is based on a set of assumptions
about optimizing behavior and perfect markets.  The shell game argument assumes that
all consumers participate in the markets for bonds and equity, and their holdings of these
assets are at interior optima.  However, the argument breaks down, and changing the
portfolio of the social security system is not a shell game if, as is indeed true, some
consumers save, but do not participate in the stock market.
The 6% average annual equity premium and widespread non-participation in the
stock market are two aspects of the equity premium puzzle that was first exposited by
Mehra and Prescott (1985).   Mehra and Prescott showed that a prototypical asset-pricing
model could not explain an equity premium larger than 35 basis points per year using
conventional values for preference parameters.  They coined the term “equity premium
puzzle” to describe the fact that the historical average equity premium greatly exceeds the
equity premium that can be explained by conventional models.  Though much of the
subsequent study of the equity premium puzzle has focused on this high equity premium,3
another aspect of the puzzle, highlighted by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), is that a majority
of consumers do not own any stocks, despite the large average reward to owning stocks.
Although the 6% average equity premium is the aspect of the equity premium
puzzle that has attracted the attention of policy makers trying to preserve the solvency of
the social security system, the widespread non-participation in the stock market is the
important aspect for addressing the shell game issue.  In this paper, I develop and analyze
a general equilibrium overlapping-generations model with fixed costs of participating in
the stock market and with a constraint that prevents young consumers from borrowing to
finance consumption.  In addition, I introduce intra-cohort heterogeneity in earnings.  The
fixed costs, together with the heterogeneity, generate an equilibrium in which high-
income consumers find it beneficial to pay the fixed cost and to participate in the stock
market, while middle-income and low-income consumers do not participate in the stock
market.  Young middle-income consumers save some of their current income and hold
riskless bonds.  Young low-income consumers are prevented from borrowing by a
binding borrowing constraint and consume all of their available resources.
Because middle-income and low-income consumers do not directly own equity,
they cannot offset the change in the portfolio of the social security system when it sells
bonds and buys equity.  Thus, the standard argument underlying the shell game result
does not hold in this model.  For the cases analyzed in Sections V and VI of this paper,
this change in the portfolio of the social security system reduces the nation’s capital
stock, despite the fact that the social security system increases (from an initial value of
zero) its holding of capital.  The reduction in the aggregate capital stock is the result of an
income effect on middle-income consumers.  These consumers benefit from an increase4
in the expected present value of lifetime resources when the social security system holds
some equity instead of lower-yielding bonds.  In response to this increase in lifetime
resources, these consumers increase their consumption, thereby reducing national saving
and national capital accumulation.  Low-income consumers, however, do not have the
resources to increase their consumption when they are young, and thus their consumption
when young is unchanged by the change in the portfolio of the social security system.
It is interesting to compare these results to those by Diamond and Geanakoplos
(1999), hereafter D-G, who present a model in which the aggregate capital stock
increases when the social security trust fund sells bonds in exchange for risky capital.
The D-G model has two classes of consumers, corresponding to the low-income and
high-income consumers in the model I present here.  By ignoring consumers who save but
do not participate in the stock market (middle-income consumers in the current model),
D-G eliminate the income effect that drives the results in the current model.  Instead, they
focus on the interest rate effects on aggregate saving.  As in the current paper, D-G find
that the change in the portfolio of the social security system increases the equilibrium
riskless interest rate.  In the current paper, with logarithmic preferences, the interest rate
has no effect on aggregate saving, but D-G use a class of preferences for which an
increase in the interest rate increases saving.  Since the D-G model does not have middle-
income consumers, through whom the income effect operates, the interest rate effect on
aggregate saving determines the effect on the aggregate capital stock.
2
                                                          
2 Though the D-G model incorporates an interest rate effect on saving, the model in the current paper has
several advantages relative to the D-G model.   The model in the current paper has three classes of
consumers, which include the two classes in D-G, and the empirically important class of consumers who
save but do not own stock.  Membership in these classes is determined endogenously in the current model,
but is exogenous in D-G.  All consumers participate in the social security system in the current model, but5
The presentation of the model begins in Section I with a description of the
production function and resulting factor prices.  The production function is consistent
with endogenous growth and has the implication that the rate of return to risky capital,
which is traded in the stock market, is random and independent of the amount of risky
capital.  The decisions of individual consumers are examined in Section II.  Consumers
choose how much to consume when young and they decide how to allocate their
portfolios to stocks and bonds.  The portfolio decision includes a decision about whether
to incur the fixed cost necessary to participate in the stock market.  After deriving the
demands for bonds and stocks by individuals in Section II, I discuss equilibrium in these
markets in Section III.
I begin analyzing the effect of having the social security system sell bonds and
buy equity in Section IV.  In order to focus sharply on the question of the effect of the
social security system’s portfolio, I analyze a fully-funded defined-contribution social
security system that initially holds only bonds.  I present an expression in Section IV for
the effect on the aggregate capital stock of a small change in the social security system’s
portfolio.  This expression is the sum of two effects.  The first effect reduces the
aggregate capital stock because of the income effect on middle-income consumers
described above.  The second effect reflects the behavior of “switchers” who would hold
stock in the initial situation, but who would not participate in the stock market if the
social security system holds some stock in its portfolio.  With the formulation of fixed
                                                                                                                                                                            
only the class of non-saving workers participate in social security in D-G.  All consumers choose
consumption based on explicit optimization in the current model, but in D-G, workers are assumed to be
non-savers.  Specifically, D-G assumes that workers set consumption when young equal to after-tax wage
income when young.  The model in the current paper is easily calibrated, but the D-G model needs
additional assumptions to make it amenable to calibration.6
costs in this model, switchers respond to the avoidance of fixed costs by increasing their
saving.  Beginning in Section V, I ignore switchers and show that the change in the
portfolio of the social security system reduces the aggregate capital stock, increases the
riskless interest rate, and increases the maximized expected utility of all young
consumers.  However, the increase in the utility of young consumers, who are the current
workers, is achieved at least partly at the expense of future workers and taxpayers.  In
Section VI, I present numerical estimates of the reduction in the aggregate capital stock,
and show that this reduction can be substantial.  I present concluding remarks in Section
VII.
I.  Production and Factor Prices
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of consumers who live for
two periods.  Consumers are endowed with n > 0 effective units of labor when they are
young, and they supply this labor inelastically.  Old consumers do not work.  There is
intra-generational heterogeneity in the amount of effective units of labor per young
consumer.  Let G(x) be the measure of workers with n < x.  Suppose that G(x) is
differentiable for x > 0, and adopt the normalizations G(f) = 1 and
N ndG n { 
f z b g
0 1                                                              (1)
where N is the aggregate effective labor input.7
The production function for an individual firm is taken from the endogenous
growth literature
3
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where Yi is the output of firm i, Ki is the capital stock of firm i, Ni is labor used by firm i,
K is the aggregate capital stock, and A > 0 is a random variable.  The private marginal
product of capital accruing to firm i is
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and the marginal product of labor is
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In equilibrium, the capital-labor ratio Ki /Ni is identical for all firms and is equal to the
aggregate capital-labor ratio, K/N.  Since N = 1,
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The gross rate of return on capital, R, is the private marginal product of capital, so
equations (3) and (5) imply
R = DA.                                                                 (6)
                                                          
3 See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 150).8
Note that the rate of return R is random, positive, and independent of the capital stock.
The wage rate, w, equals the marginal product of labor, so equations (4) and (5)
imply
w = (1-D)AK.                                                              (7)
II.  The Decisions of Individual Consumers
There is a continuum of young consumers indexed by n, the endowment of
effective units of labor.  I will show in this section that the optimal consumption and
portfolio decisions of a young consumer assign that consumer to one of three groups.
Young consumers who save some of their disposable income and participate in the stock
market are assigned to group H.  Young consumers who save some of their disposable
income but do not participate in the stock market are assigned to group M, and young
consumers who consume all of their disposable income and do not participate in the stock
market are assigned to group L.  I will show that group H consists of high-income
consumers, group M consists of middle-income consumers, and group L consists of low-
income consumers.
A young consumer endowed with n effective units of labor earns labor income of
wn where w is the wage rate in equation (7).  Each young consumer pays a tax T.  Old
consumers do not earn labor income, but receive benefits from a fully-funded defined-
contribution social security system.  Specifically, the social security system invests Tb > 0
in riskless bonds and Tk > 0 in risky capital on behalf of each young consumer.  When
these consumers are old, they receive social security benefits of Tbr + TkR where r > 0 is9
the (gross) rate of return on riskless bonds and R > 0 is the (gross) rate of return on risky
capital in equation (6).
Each consumer must decide how much to save when young and how to allocate
this saving between riskless bonds and risky capital, subject to a borrowing constraint that
prevents young consumers from borrowing to finance consumption.  There are no
transactions costs associated with investing in riskless bonds, but there is a fixed cost of
participating in the stock market, where the claims to risky capital are traded.  I will
model this fixed cost to include both a resource cost and a utility cost, but either type of
cost alone is sufficient for the results in this paper.  The resource cost is a fixed amount
F1 > 0 that must be paid when young in order to participate in the stock market.  The
utility cost will be described below when the utility function is introduced.
Having described all of the opportunities facing a consumer, I will present the
budget constraint more formally.  After consuming an amount c, a young consumer has
private saving of sw nT Fc {  G 1 , where G  is a dummy variable that equals one if the
consumer participates in the stock market, and equals 0 otherwise.  Part of this saving is
used to purchase risky capital, k, in the stock market and the remainder, s – k, is used to
purchase riskless bonds.  Let bsk b { T  denote the amount of riskless bonds held,
both directly and indirectly through the social security system, by a young consumer, and
let hk k { T  be the amount of risky capital held, both directly and indirectly.  Define a
{ b + h as the total value of the assets held directly and indirectly.  Using the definition of
s yields
abh Fc {    : G 1 ,                                                   (8a)10
where                                       :{    wn T bk TT                                                       (8b)
is the value of wealth owned, both directly and indirectly, by the consumer when young.
4
An old consumer consumes all available resources, which consist of br, the
principal and interest on both direct and indirect holdings of riskless bonds, and hR, the
gross value of risky capital held both directly and indirectly. Letting x denote
consumption when old yields
   x = br + hR.                                                               (9)
The utility function is
5
Uc FE x   ln ln GE 2 b gl q ,       E > 0                               (10)
where F2 > 0 is a utility cost of participating in the stock market.  The consumer can
avoid this cost by not participating in the stock market, thereby setting G = 0.  As
mentioned above, either F1 or F2 can be zero, but F1 + F2 > 0.
                                                          
4 The borrowing constraint prevents consumption when young from exceeding disposable income, wn – T.
The present value of the claim on future social security benefits, Tb + Tk, is part of total wealth, :, but is not
part of disposable income, wn - T.
5 The quantitative results in Table 2 below would be unchanged if the utility function in equation (10) were
replaced by the more general utility function Uc F E x  

 ln ln G
E
I
I
2
1
1 bg mr , which, like the utility
function in equation (10) has an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to one.  However, the more
general utility function presented here has a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to I, whereas
the utility function in equation (10) has a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to one.  With the more
general utility function, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (when the borrowing constraint is
not binding) equals 1/(1+E) when Tk = 0, just as for the utility function in equation (10).11
II.A.  Savers Who Participate in the Stock Market
A consumer who participates in the stock market chooses current consumption c,
bonds b, and risky capital h, to maximize the utility function in equation (10) subject to
the constraints in equations (8) and (9).
6  Equivalently, the consumer chooses a, the total
amount of assets held directly and indirectly, and J { h/a, the share of the total assets held
in risky capital.  Recognizing that b = (1-J)a and h = Ja, substitute equations (8) and (9)
into the utility function in equation (10), with G = 1,  to obtain
max ln ln , , a FFa a r J EE \ J   :     12 bg b g                              (11a)
where
\J J J ,l n rE rR bg b g ns {  1 .                                          (11b)
The optimal value of a is determined by differentiating the maximand in equation
(11a) with respect to a, setting the derivative equal to zero, and solving to obtain
aF F  


E
E 1
12 : bg .                                               (12)
Equation (12) shows that the optimal size of the portfolio, a { b+h, consisting of both
direct and indirect holdings, is independent of the rates of return on the riskless and risky
                                                          
6 I have assumed that the social security parameters Tb and Tk and the fixed costs F1 and F2 are such that the
borrowing constraint is not binding for consumers who choose to participate in the stock market. See
footnote 16.12
assets, and is proportional to wealth, :, adjusted for the fixed costs of participating in the
stock market.  The fixed cost F1 is a resource cost and is directly subtracted from first-
period resources, thereby reducing the optimal size of the portfolio.  The fixed cost F2 is a
utility cost and hence does not directly reduce resources.  However, an increase in F2
reduces the optimal size of the portfolio because an increase in F2 increases the marginal
utility of consumption when young, and therefore shifts consumption away from old age
toward youth.
7
Now consider the optimal allocation of the portfolio.  The first-order condition for
J is obtained by differentiating the maximand in equation (11a) with respect to J, setting
the derivative equal to zero, and solving to obtain
ZrE
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Equation (13) implicitly defines the optimal equity share J(r) as a function of the riskless
interest rate r, given the distribution of the risky rate of return on capital R.  It is
straightforward to show that
8 J’(r) < 0 and that
9 J(r) has the same sign as the (ex ante)
                                                          
7 However, if fixed costs involve a reduction in utility when old as well as a reduction in utility when young,
they could increase the optimal size of the portfolio.  For example, if the utility function is
Uc FE x F    ln ln GE G 23 bg bg mr , the decision problem of a participant in the stock market can be written as
max ln ln , bh bhF F E b rh RF :       12 3 bg b g mr E .  The first-order conditions with respect to b and h are
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123 : /bg ch .   If F1 + F2 – F3/(Er) > 0, fixed
costs reduce optimal total assets.  However, if F1 + F2 – F3/(Er) < 0, fixed costs increase optimal total
assets.  The optimal total amount of assets is unaffected by the fixed costs in the special case with (1) no
resource costs of participation (F1 = 0); (2) F2 = F3; and (3) Er = 1.
8Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (13) along with13
equity premium E{R-r}.  In the general equilibrium in this model, J(r) is positive so the
equity premium is positive.  Henceforth, I will confine attention to cases with a positive
equity premium.
Let bH(:, r, Tk) and hH(:, r, Tk) be the optimal values of b and h for a consumer
who participates in the stock market.  (The subscript “H” indicates that the consumer is a
high-income consumer.)  Equation (12) and the definition of J(r) imply
br r F F Hk :: ,, TJ
E
E b g b g b g  

 1
1
12                                   (14)
and
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Let VH(:, r, Tk) denote the maximized value of the utility function for a consumer
who participates in the stock market.  Substituting the optimal values of b and h from
equations (14) and (15) into equation (11a) and simplifying yields
Vr F F r Hk :: , , ln ln ln , TE E E E E E \ J b g bg bg bg b gb g         111 12 .       (16)
Inspection of equation (16) yields
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proves that J’(r) < 0.
9 Since Z(J, r) is strictly decreasing in J  (see equation (*) in footnote 8) and Z(0,r) = E{R-r}/r has the same
sign as the equity premium, the optimal value of J, which satisfies equation (13), has the same sign as the
equity premium.14
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and
wT
wT
Vr Hk
k
:,, b g
  0.                                                              (17c)
Equation (17a) shows that an increase in lifetime resources : increases the
maximized value of utility.  Whether an increase in the riskless rate r increases or
decreases maximized utility depends on whether the consumer would choose a long or a
short position in bonds.  As shown in equation (17b), a consumer who would choose a
long position in bonds (1-J> 0), and thus would be a recipient of interest, benefits from
an increase in r;  a consumer who would choose a short position in bonds (1-J< 0),
10 and
thus would be a payer of interest, suffers a loss in utility when the interest rate on bonds
increases.  Equation (17c) shows that a change in Tk that leaves : unchanged has no
effect on the maximized value of utility.  For instance, an increase in Tk accompanied by
an equal decrease in Tb leaves : unchanged and, according to equation (17c), has no
effect on the maximized value of utility.
                                                          
10 The borrowing constraint does not allow the consumer to borrow to finance consumption, but does permit
borrowing to finance the holding of capital, so J(r) could exceed one.15
II.B.  Savers Who Do Not Participate in the Stock Market
For a consumer who does not participate in the stock market, the direct holding of
risky capital, k, is zero, and thus the total (indirect) holding of risky capital is h = Tk.  By
not participating in the stock market, this consumer avoids the resource cost F1 and the
utility cost F2.  In this subsection, I focus on consumers who do not participate in the
stock market, but who choose to consume less than their disposable income, wn – T.
Such consumers choose b to maximize the utility function in equation (10) with G = 0 and
subject to the constraints in equations (8) and (9) with h set equal to the parameter Tk.
The decision problem can be written as
max ln ln bk k b E br R   :    TE T bg b g mr .                                       (18)
Let bM(:, r, Tk) denote the optimal value of b for a saver who does not participate
in the stock market.  (The subscript “M” indicates a middle-income consumer.)  In
Appendix A, I show that
br M :: ,, 0
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where the inequality in equation (20) follows from the fact that the equity premium,
E{R}–r, is positive.
The optimal holding of bonds by a saver who does not participate in the stock
market is particularly simple in the case in which the social security system does not hold
any equity.  Formally, this case is represented by Tk = 0, and equation (19) shows that in
this case, the optimal holding of bonds is proportional to wealth, :, and is independent of
the riskless interest rate, r.  Thus, a one-dollar increase in wealth, :, increases optimal
bond holding by E/(1+E).
To interpret the partial derivative in equation (20) it is important to observe that
wealth, : is held fixed when Tk is changed.  Suppose, for the moment that the expected
rate of return on risky capital, E{R}, equals the riskless rate r.  In this case, equation (20)
indicates that a one-dollar increase in Tk, accompanied by a one-dollar decrease in Tb to
keep : unchanged, reduces the optimal bond holding by one dollar so that the total size
of the portfolio is unchanged.  Now suppose that the expected rate of return on risky
capital exceeds the riskless rate.  In this case, a one-dollar increase in Tk accompanied by
a one-dollar decrease in Tb has a positive income effect that stimulates consumption and
reduces the size of the consumer’s portfolio.  More precisely, this change in Tk and Tb
effectively increases the consumer’s expected second-period resources by the equity
premium, E{R}- r, which has a present value of [E{R} - r]/r.  Since the marginal
propensity to consume when young is 1/(1+E), consumption increases by 'cM {
[1/(1+E)][E{R} - r]/r, and the total portfolio falls by 'cM.  Since the consumer’s (indirect)17
holding of equity increases by one dollar, the fall in the consumer’s holding of bonds is 1
+'cM = 1 + [1/(1+E)][E{R} - r]/r, as shown in equation (20).
Let VM(:, r, Tk) denote the maximized value of the utility function for a saver
who does not participate in the stock market.  Substituting the optimal value of b from
equation (19) into equation (18) and simplifying yields
Vr r M :: , , ln ln ln ln 01 1 1 bg bg bg bg        EE E E E E                  (21)
Inspection of equation (21) yields
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An increase in wealth, :, increases the maximized value of utility as shown in
equation (22a).  Because a saver who does not hold any risky capital, either directly or
indirectly, has a long position in bonds, an increase in the riskless interest rate r increases
the maximized value of utility as shown in equation (22b).
To determine the effect on utility of an increase in Tk from an initial value of zero,
differentiate equation (18) with respect to Tk and evaluate the resulting derivative at b =
bM(:, r, )  and Tk = 0 to obtain
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A one-dollar increase in Tk, accompanied by a one-dollar decrease in Tb, which
keeps : constant, increases the expected present value of lifetime resources by [E{R} –
r]/r dollars.  Multiplying this increase in expected present value by the effect of : on VM
shown in equation (22a) yields the effect on the maximized value of utility shown in
equation (23).
II.C.  The Participation Decision
For young consumers who save some of their disposable income, an important
decision is whether to participate in the stock market.  If the benefit of participating in the
stock market outweighs the fixed cost of participation, then the consumer will participate.
Otherwise the consumer will not directly hold any risky capital.  To make this decision, a
saver must compare VH(:, r, Tk), which is the maximized value of utility if the consumer
participates in the stock market, with VM(:, r, Tk), which is the maximized value of utility
if the consumer does not participate in the stock market.  Define
Dr k :,, T b g { Vr Vr Hk Mk :: ,, ,, TT bg bg  .                                (24)
If D(:, r, Tk) > 0, the consumer will choose to participate in the stock market, and
if D(:, r, Tk) < 0 the consumer will choose not to participate in the stock market.  If D(:,
r, Tk) = 0, the consumer will be indifferent about participating in this market.19
Define the critical value   , : r k T bg  as the value of :, given
11 r and Tk, for which
the consumer is indifferent about participating in the stock market.  Formally,   , : r k T b g
satisfies Dr r kk  ,, , : TT bg ej   0.  To compute the critical value   : in the case with Tk = 0,
substitute equations (16) and (21) into the definition of D(:, r, Tk) in equation (24), use
the definition of \(J, r) in equation (11b), and evaluate the resulting expression at Tk = 0
to obtain
  Dr
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Setting the right hand side of equation (25a) equal to zero and solving for :, yields the
critical value of : as
 ,
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For consumers with : <   , : r 0 bg , D(:, r, 0) < 0 and it is optimal not to participate in the
stock market.  For consumers with : >   , : r 0 bg , D(:, r, 0) > 0 and it is optimal to
                                                          
11 The distribution of the risky rate of return R is also given, though this distribution is not reflected in the
notation.
12 <(r) can be written as maxJ \*(J, r) where \*(J, r) { E{ln[1-J +J R/r]}.  Observe that \*(0, r) = 0 so
that <(r) > 0.  Recall from footnote 9 that if the ex ante equity premium is positive, the optimal value of J is
positive, which implies <(r) > 0.20
participate in the stock market.  Put simply, high-income consumers will buy risky capital
and middle-income and low-income consumers will not.
An increase in the riskless interest rate r reduces the benefit of investing in the
stock market relative to holding only riskless bonds, and thus increases the critical value
 , : r 0 bg .
13  An increase in Tk provides some of the benefit of investing in the stock market
and thus reduces the gain to participating directly in the stock market relative to holding
only riskless bonds in the directly-held portfolio.  Therefore, an increase in Tk increases
the critical value   :.
14
The only source of intra-generational heterogeneity in this model, and thus the
only factor that causes : to differ among consumers in a given generation, is variation in
endowments of effective units of labor, n.  Since : is a linear function of n, there is a
unique critical value of n, call it   n, that separates young participants in the stock market
and young non-participants.  It follows from the definition of : in equation (8b) that
  n
w
T bk    
1
: TT ej .                                                      (27)
Young consumers with nn !  will participate in the market for risky capital, and young
consumers with nn    will not participate in this market.
                                                          
13 If the ex ante equity premium E{R}– r is positive, the optimal value of J  in the definition of <(r) is
positive, and hence <(r) is a decreasing function of the riskless interest rate r.  Therefore, equation (26)
implies that   , : r 0 bg  is an increasing function of r.
14 Formally, w
w
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where the first equality follows from the definition of D(:, r, Tk) in equation (24), the second equality
follows from equation (17c), and the inequality follows from equation (23).  Thus, an increase in Tk must be
offset by an increase in : to maintain the right hand side of equation (24) equal to zero.21
Consumers for whom ::     (equivalently, nn   ) are indifferent about
participating in the stock market.  I will refer to these consumers as “switchers” because a
small change in r or Tk  will change   :, and these consumers may switch their
participation status.  Confine attention to the case in which Tk = 0 and define
': :   ,,  ,,
b MH brbr { 00 ej ej  as the difference in the holdings (direct and indirect) of
bonds and ':   ,,
k H hr { 0 ej  as the difference in the holdings of risky capital between
those consumers who do not participate in the stock market and those who participate in
the stock market.  It follows from equations (19), (14), and (15) that
':  
b rr F F  

  !
E
E
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1
10 12 bg bg ch bg                                    (28)
and
':  
k rF F  

  J
E
E bg ej 1
0 12 .                                       (29)
A switcher who chooses not to participate in the stock market holds more bonds and less
risky capital than a switcher who chooses to participate in the stock market.
The effect of the participation decision on the size of the total portfolio of a
switcher is calculated by adding equations (28) and (29) to obtain
''  bk FF  

!
E
E 1
0 12 bg .                                            (30)22
As shown in equation (30), a switcher who chooses not to participate in the stock
market has a larger total portfolio in the first period than a switcher who chooses to
participate in the stock market.  By not participating in the stock market, the switcher
avoids the fixed cost F1 + F2 and therefore increases the total value of the first-period
portfolio by [E/(1+E)](F1+F2).  Of course, in terms of utility, the avoidance of the fixed
cost F1+F2, which increases the size of the portfolio, is offset by the fact that the rate of
return on the portfolio is lower when the switcher has no direct holding of risky capital
than when the switcher participates directly in the stock market.
II.D.  Young Consumers Who Do Not Save
15
Young consumers are allowed to borrow to purchase risky capital but are not
allowed to borrow to finance consumption in excess of disposable income.  Formally, this
borrowing constraint is
 c < wn – T.                                                       (31)
Suppose that Tk = 0 and consider a young consumer with : <   :, which implies
that the consumer does not participate in the stock market.  In the absence of the
borrowing constraint in equation (31), this consumer would consume 
1
1E
:.  This
amount of consumption exceeds the amount of consumption permitted by the borrowing
constraint in equation (31) if : > (1+E)(wn – T), or equivalently if
                                                          
15 I thank Martin Feldstein for suggesting consideration of young consumers who face binding borrowing
constraints that prevent their consumption from increasing in response to a change in the portfolio of the
social security system.23
:: {

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1 E
E
Tb.                                                   (32)
Henceforth, I will assume that the level of wealth at which the borrowing
constraint just binds, :0, is less than the level of wealth at which savers are indifferent
about participating in the stock market,   :.
16  Thus, :0 and   : define three regions in the
wealth distribution.  Low-income consumers have : smaller than :0.  These consumers
consume their disposable income wn – T when they are young and do not participate in
the stock market.  Middle-income consumers have : greater than :0, so that the
borrowing constraint is not binding, but smaller than   :, so that they do not participate in
the stock market.  High-income consumers have : greater than   :.  They save some of
their disposable and participate in the stock market.
The critical value that separates consumers for whom the borrowing constraint
binds from consumers for whom the constraint does not bind can be expressed in terms of
the endowment of labor.  Substituting :0
1
{
E
E
Tb into the definition of wealth in
equation (8b), and recalling that Tk = 0, yields n
w
T b 0
11
  F
HG I
KJ E
T .  Young consumers
with n < n0 will consume all of their disposable income, and young consumers with n > n0
will save some of their disposable income.
                                                          
16 Equations (26) and (32) imply that for Tk = 0 the condition that :0 <   : is satisfied if and only if
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With the more general preferences introduced in footnote 5, the benefit of optimally allocating a portfolio to
stocks and bonds, <(r), is max ln J
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.  Allowing the coefficient of relative risk24
III.  Capital Market Equilibrium
In this section I examine equilibrium in the markets for riskless bonds and risky
capital.  Let B
D(r, Tk, Tb, T, AK) be the aggregate demand for bonds, which can be written
as
Br T A K b A K nT r d G n
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D
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 .           (33)
The first integral on the right hand side of equation (33) is the demand for bonds by high-
income consumers, and the second integral on the right hand side is the demand for bonds
by middle-income consumers.  The final term on the right hand side, TbG(n0), is the
amount of bonds held indirectly by low-income consumers, who do not directly hold any
bonds.
Riskless bonds are issued by the government.  In the context of the United States,
riskless bonds are issued by the Treasury and are held by individuals and by the Social
Security Trust Fund.  Let B denote the aggregate quantity of riskless bonds issued by the
Treasury.
17  In principle, private consumers, or groups of private consumers could issue
bonds, but since these privately issued bonds would be assets of some private agents and
                                                                                                                                                                            
aversion I to exceed one can reduce <(r) relative to its value in equation (25b), and thus can reduce the size
of the fixed cost F1+ F2 needed to make condition (*) hold.
17Assume that Bw n T d G n bk d

 
f z
E
E
TT
1 0bg b g .  The right hand side of this condition is the aggregate
demand for bonds that would arise if no consumers participated in the stock market.  The aggregate demand
for bonds cannot exceed this value, and thus equilibrium requires that the supply of bonds be no larger than
this amount.25
liabilities of other private agents, the aggregate net supply of bonds would continue to be
equal to B.  Equilibrium in the bond market is represented by
BBr T A K
D
kb   ,,, , TT b g.                                                 (34)
Let K
D(r, Tk, Tb, T, AK) be the aggregate demand for risky capital, which can be
written as
      Kr T A K G n h A K nT r d G n
D
kb k H b k k n ,,, ,  ,,
 TT T D T T T b g b g b g c h b g {   
f z 1.     (35)
Low-income and middle-income young consumers hold capital only indirectly, through
the social security system, and their aggregate holding of risky capital is shown by the
first term on the right hand side of equation (35).  The second term on the right hand side
of this equation is the demand for risky capital by high-income consumers.
Let  c K  be the aggregate amount of risky capital held at the end of the current
period.  It is distinct from K, which is the aggregate amount of capital held at the
beginning of the current period (the end of the previous period) and used in production
during the current period.  Equilibrium in the market for risky capital is represented by
c   KK r T A K
D
kb ,,, , TT bg .                                                   (36)
IV.  The Effect of Investing a Small Amount of Social Security in the Stock Market
Now consider the effects of changing the portfolio of the social security system.
Specifically, assume that initially the social security system holds only riskless bonds so26
that Tk = 0.  Then suppose that in the current period, the social security system sells a
small amount of bonds per capita and uses the proceeds of this sale to purchase risky
capital.  Formally, dTb = - dTk < 0 so that the total value of assets in the social security
system is unchanged.  In addition, suppose that the Treasury does not change the current
amount of bonds, B, outstanding at the end of the current period.  The analysis in this
paper will focus on the effects of this policy during the current period.
18
Because the change in the portfolio of the social security system leaves the value
of Tb + Tk unchanged, the value of wealth, :, is unchanged for each young consumer in
the current period.  This invariance of : to the composition of the portfolio of the social
security system implies that if all consumers participate in all markets, including the stock
market, they will not change their total holdings (direct plus indirect) of either bonds or
stocks.  Specifically, when the social security system sells a dollar of bonds and purchases
a dollar of risky capital on behalf of each young consumer, each young consumer would
offset this asset swap by purchasing an additional dollar of bonds and selling one dollar of
risky capital.  In this case, investing social security funds in the stock market is merely a
“shell game” with no effects on the real allocation of consumption.
                                                          
18 A fully dynamic analysis that examines future periods as well as the current period would have to take
account of the Treasury’s budget constraint Bt+1 = rtBt + Gt – Tt where Bt is the aggregate value of bonds
outstanding at the beginning of period t, rt is the gross riskless interest rate on assets held from period t-1 to
period t, Gt is aggregate government purchases by the Treasury during period t, and Tt is total tax
collections during period t.  None of the variables rt, Bt, Bt+1, Gt and Tt is affected by the change in policy in
period t.  However, the riskless interest rate rt+1 will change as a result of this policy, which will require
future changes in government purchases, taxes, or the path of bonds outstanding.  These changes do not
affect the equilibrium in the current period (period t), which is the focus of this analysis.  Because Diamond
and Geanakoplos (1999) analyze future periods as well as the period in which the portfolio of the social
security system is changed, they must take a stand on how the government reacts to a change in the interest
rate on its bonds.  They assume that an increase in the interest rate leads the government to increase taxes
on old consumers to maintain the level of government bonds unchanged.27
The shell game result depends on the assumption that all consumers participate in
the stock market and hence can offset the effects of the change in the portfolio of the
social security system.  But most consumers hold no stock in their portfolios,
19 and hence
the assumptions underlying the shell game result are violated.  The present model takes
account of non-stockholders and the consequent departure from the shell game result.  In
Appendix B, I show that
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The effect on the capital stock in equation (37) is the sum of two terms.  The first
term represents the reduction in aggregate saving resulting from the increased
consumption of middle-income consumers, who do not participate in the stock market.
This increased consumption arises because a one-dollar shift from bonds to risky capital
increases expected second-period income by the equity premium E{R} - r, and the present
value of this increase is [E{R} - r]/r.  The marginal propensity to consume when young is
1/(1+E), so the increase in the present value of expected income increases the
consumption of each middle-income consumer by 'cM { [1/(1+E)] [E{R} - r]/r.
20  The
aggregate effect, represented by the first of the two terms in equation (37), is obtained by
multiplying 'cM by the measure of middle-income consumers, Gn Gn  bg bg  0 .
                                                          
19 See footnote 25.
20 Low-income consumers also enjoy an increase in expected second-period income but are prevented from
increasing their current consumption by a binding borrowing constraint.28
The second term on the right hand side of equation (37) is the increase in
aggregate saving that arises as switchers endogenously change their status from group H,
which holds risky capital, to group M, which does not participate in the stock market.
The saving of each switcher increases by ''  bk  , and the measure of switchers is
dn
d
dG n
k


T bg .
V.  Ignoring the Effects of Switchers
For the remainder of this paper, I will ignore the behavior of switchers.  One
rationale for ignoring switchers is that I am analyzing a change in the portfolio of the
social security system after the current generation of workers has decided whether to
participate in the stock market for risky capital, but before they make a final choice about
how much to consume when young.  In this scenario, consumers are allowed to react to
the change in the portfolio of the social security system.  Consumers who had been
indifferent about participating in the stock market, but who had nonetheless chosen to
participate, have already incurred the fixed cost of participation.  Since this cost is already
sunk, these consumers will not switch to non-stockholder status.  Simply put, consumers
with nn    will not switch away from participating in the stock market.
21
A second rationale for ignoring switchers is that the direction in which their
saving responds to the change in the portfolio of the social security system is not robust to
the specification of fixed costs.  With the formulation of fixed costs in this paper,
                                                          
21 The direction of the switch is important for the sunk cost argument here.  In this case, the change in the
portfolio of the social security system increases the riskless interest rate r, which increases   :.  In addition,29
switchers who choose not to hold stocks have higher saving than switchers who choose to
hold stocks, but this result could be reversed by a different formulation of fixed costs.
22
V.A.  The Effect on Portfolios of Individual Consumers
Ignoring the behavior of switchers, the effect on the aggregate capital stock of the
change in the portfolio of the social security system is given by the first of the two terms
in equation (37).  Table 1 illustrates this result by focusing on the portfolios of individual
consumers.  First examine the row for low-income consumers.  Young low-income
consumers do not hold any assets directly.  All of their assets are held indirectly through
the social security system, so the change in the portfolio of the social security system
increases capital by one dollar and reduces bonds by one dollar for each young low-
income consumer.  Now examine the row for middle-income consumers.  As discussed
below equation (20), a one-dollar increase in Tk accompanied by a one-dollar decrease in
Tb causes middle-income consumers to increase their consumption by 'cM {
[1/(1+E][E{R}-r]/r dollars, and therefore to reduce their total assets by 'cM dollars.
Because each middle-income consumer increases the holding of risky capital by one
dollar while reducing total assets by 'cM dollars, each middle-income consumer’s holding
                                                                                                                                                                            
the increase in Tk increases   :.  Since   : increases, potential switchers would switch from participating to
not participating in the stock market, but they would not avoid the fixed cost already incurred.
22 Suppose that in addition to the fixed costs F1 and F2, participation in the stock market involves a utility
cost when old.  For example, if the utility function is Uc FE x F    ln ln GE G 23 bg bg mr , then, as shown in
footnote 7, abh FF F r { 


E
E
E
1
123 : /bg ch .  Recall from equation (19) that a middle-income
consumer’s total assets equal  E
E 1
:.  If F1 + F2 – F3/(Er) > 0, as in the model in the text, the total assets of
a switcher who participates in the stock market will be less than those of a switcher who does not participate
in the stock market.  However, if F1 + F2 – F3/(Er) < 0, the total assets of a switcher who participates in the
stock market will be greater than those of a switcher who does not participate in the stock market.30
of bonds is reduced by 1 + 'cM dollars, as shown in the final column of the middle-
income consumer’s row.
Table 1
Effect of 'Tk = -'Tb = 1, if dG n  bg   0
Type of
consumer
Change in:
[measure]
Total Assets
(per capita)
Capital
(per capita)
Bonds
(per capita)
Low-Income
[G(n0)]
01 - 1
Middle-Income
[Gn Gn  bg bg  0 ]
{ 


'c
ER r
r
M
1
1 E
lq
1 -(1+'cM)
High-Income
[1Gn  bg ]
0 


Gn c Gn Gn
Gn
M 

bg bg bg
bg
' 0
1
Gn c Gn Gn
Gn
M 

bg bg bg
bg


' 0
1
Aggregate  'cG n G n M  bg bg 0  'cG n G n M  bg bg 0 0
Since the aggregate supply of bonds is held fixed, equilibrium in the bond market
requires that high-income consumers increase their holdings of bonds by the amount
shown in the final column of Table 1, so that the change in the aggregate holding of
bonds, shown in the lower right corner of Table 1, is zero.  High-income consumers are
induced to increase their holdings of bonds by an increase in the riskless interest rate r,
which causes them to shift some of their assets from risky capital to riskless bonds.
23
Since the total value of assets held by each high-income consumer is unchanged, the
                                                          
23 The effect on the riskless interest rate can be calculated by setting dG n  bg   0 in equation (B.6) to obtain
dr
d
B
B kr T
T   !0  where BT < 0 is defined in equation (B.4) and Br > 0 is defined in equation (B.3).31
increase in bond holdings in the final column is offset by an equal decrease in the holding
of risky capital, as shown in Table 1.
The effect on the aggregate holding of risky capital is obtained by weighting the
effects on low-income, middle-income, and high-income consumers by their respective
measures.  As shown in the final row of Table 1, the aggregate effect on the amount of
risky capital is  'cG n G n M  b g b g 0 , which equals the first of the two terms on the right
hand side of equation (37).
V.B.  The Effects on Utility
The replacement of a small amount of bonds by an equal value of risky capital in
the portfolio of the social security system changes the utility of middle-income consumers
by dVM, where
dV
Vr
d
Vr
r
dr M
Mk
k
k
Mk
kk
 
w
w
F
HG I
KJ 
w
w
F
HG I
KJ !
  
:: ,, ,, T
T
T
T
TT
bg bg
00
0                  (38)
and the sign is obtained using equations (23) and (22b) along with dTk > 0 and dr > 0.
Middle-income consumers benefit in two ways from the change in the portfolio of the
social security system.  First, they benefit from holding risky capital, which has a higher
expected rate of return than bonds.  In addition, because they are recipients of interest
income, they benefit from the increase in the riskless interest rate.  Similarly, low-income
consumers benefit from holding risky capital, and because they are recipients of interest
on their indirect holdings of bonds in the social security system, they benefit from the
increase in the riskless interest rate.32
The effect on the utility of high-income consumers is
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where the second equality uses equation (17b).  High-income consumers, who hold
capital directly, are not directly affected by the change in Tk  because they can offset this
change in the social security system’s portfolio by changing their own directly-held
portfolios.  However, the change in the riskless interest rate affects the maximized utility
of high-income consumers.  Since dr > 0, the sign of the effect in equation (39) is the
same as the sign of 1 – J, which is the share of bonds in the portfolios of high-income
consumers.  In principle, if the aggregate supply of bonds, B, is sufficiently small, the
value of 1 – J  could be negative, but the empirically relevant case is one in which high-
income consumers have positive holdings of bonds so that 1 – J  is positive.  In this case,
high-income consumers benefit from the increase in the riskless interest rate.
I have shown that if high-income consumers have long positions in bonds, the
change in the portfolio of the social security system increases the utility of young
consumers in all three income classes.  Old consumers are unaffected by this change.  So
does the change in the portfolio of the social security system represent a free lunch,
making some consumers better off without harming others?  The answer is no.  The next
generation will work with a smaller capital stock and thus will have smaller wage income
than it would have had otherwise.  In addition, the increase in the riskless interest rate is
costly to the issuer of bonds.  Since the government is the issuer of bonds, the increase in33
the riskless interest rate is costly to the government, which means that it is costly to future
taxpayers.
24
VI.  An Estimate of the Effect on the Aggregate Capital Stock
The effect of a change in the portfolio of the social security system on the
aggregate capital stock, ignoring switchers, is given by the first of the two terms on the
right hand side of equation (37)
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, ignoring switchers.  (40)
This effect is the product of three term terms.  The first term, 1/(1+E), is the marginal
propensity to consume when young.  I will assume that one period in the model
corresponds to 25 years and that the annual rate of time preference is 1%.  Under these
assumptions, E = (1.01)
-25 = 0.7798, and the marginal propensity to consume is 1/(1+E) =
0.5619.
The second term is the present value of the equity premium, [E{R}-r]/r.
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1993, Table 2, p. 35) report that over the period 1892-1987,
the average value of the equity premium, E{R} – r, is 0.0663 and the average (gross)
riskless rate is r = 1.0119, so the average rate of return on equity, E{R}, is 1.0782.  These
                                                          
24 There is an element of a free lunch here because the social security system can purchase risky capital on
behalf of consumers without incurring the costs F1 or F2.  However, it remains true that future generations
of workers and taxpayers are harmed by the reduction in their wages and by the consequences of the
increased cost of debt service.34
average rates of return are expressed on an annual basis.  Treating a period in the model
as 25 years implies [E{R}-r]/r = [1.0782
25 - 1.0119
25]/1.0119
25  =  3.8870.
The third term is the fraction of consumers who save some of their disposable
income but do not participate in the stock market, i.e., the fraction of consumers that are
middle-income consumers.  Ameriks and Zeldes (2000, Exhibit 9B) report that 36.8% of
households held less than $5000 of financial wealth and less than $1000 of stock in any
form in 1995.  I will treat these households as low-income households and thus set G(n0)
= 0.368.  They also report that 36.7% of households owned more than $1000 of stock in
1995.  I will treat these households as high-income households in the model, and thus set
Gn  bg  = 0.633.
25  Therefore, the fraction of middle-income consumers, Gn Gn  bg bg  0 , is
0.265.
26
                                                          
25 Mankiw and Zeldes (1991, Table 1) report that in 1984, 72.4% of households did not own any stock and
4.5% of households held some stock but less than $1000 of stock, so the comparable value of Gn  bg in 1984
was 0.769.  The decline in Gn  bg  from 1984 to 1995 reflects the increasing extent of stock ownership in the
U.S. economy over that time.
26I have assumed that all young consumers have equal claims on future social security benefits, despite the
fact that they have different pre-tax income, wn.  An alternative specification is that a consumer with
effective labor endowment n has a claim on future social security benefits with a present value of O(n)T,
where  c t O n bg 0 and  O nd Gn bg bg
0 1
f z   ,  so that the present value of the aggregate claim on future social
security benefits is T.  In this case, the term Gn Gn  bg bg  0  in equations (37) and (40) is replaced by
O nd Gn
n
n bg bg
0
 z .  In the case examined in the text, O(n) { 1, so that  O nd Gn Gn Gn
n
n bg bg bg bg
0
0

 z   .
However, in the case with O(n) increasing in n,  O nd Gn
n
n bg bg
0
 z can be greater than, equal to, or less than
Gn Gn  bg bg  0 .  Consider an example in which n is uniformly distributed on the interval [1, 4], and the
present value of the claim on future social security benefits is proportional to wage income wn, so that
O(n)= n/2.5.  Suppose that n0 = 2 and   n  = 3.  In this case, Gn Gn  / bg bg   0 13  and  O nd Gn
n
n bg bg
0
13

/ z    so
that the effect of the change in the portfolio of the social security system is the same whether the social
security benefit is proportional to wn or independent of wn.  If social security benefits and taxes are capped,
then for some a > 0, O(n) = awn if n < n  and O(n) = awn  if n > n .  In this case,  O nd Gn
n
n bg bg
0
 z exceeds
Gn Gn  b g b g  0 , if the distribution of n is uniform on the interval [1, 4], n0 = 2,   n  = 3, and 1 < n < 4.  In this
case, the effect on the aggregate capital stock is higher if social security benefits are proportional to wn (up35
Multiplying the marginal propensity consume, 0.5619, by the equity premium,
3.8870, and by the fraction of middle-income consumers, 0.265, yields
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05788,       ignoring switchers.             (41)
If the social security system increases its holding of risky capital by one dollar per
capita and reduces its holding of riskless bonds by one dollar per capita, the aggregate
holding of risky capital will fall by more than 57 cents per capita.  Because the magnitude
of this effect is surprisingly large, I explore the sensitivity of this calculation to various
factors.  Table 2 reports the quantitative effects of various changes that are designed to
reduce the magnitude of this effect.  Column (1) contains the baseline calculation
presented in equation (41).  The effect on capital stock is reported in the final row.
Reducing the rate of time preference to zero reduces the marginal propensity to consume,
1/(1+E), to 0.5 and reduces the magnitude of the effect on the capital stock to 0.52
(column (2)).  Reducing the assumed number of years per period to 20 reduces both the
marginal propensity to consume and the average equity premium per period, and thus
reduces the magnitude of the effect on the capital stock to 0.37 (column (3)).  Reducing
the expected rate of return on risky capital, E{R}, by 1 percentage point per year reduces
the magnitude of the effect on the capital stock to 0.43 (column (4)).  Increasing the
riskless interest rate by one percentage point per year reduces the magnitude of the effect
to 0.42 (column (5)).  Although each of the changes explored in columns (2) – (5) reduces
the magnitude of the effect, in all cases the magnitude of the effect remains greater than
                                                                                                                                                                            
to the cap) than if they are independent of wn.  Of course, the results of this example could be reversed for a36
0.35.  Putting together all of these changes reduces the magnitude of the effect to 0.19 as
shown in column (6).  Thus, even allowing for the possibility that the baseline calculation
overstates the magnitude of the effect, the effect appears to be quite substantial.
Table 2
Effect of dT T T Tk = -dT T T Tb > 0 on Aggregate Capital Stock
(1)
baseline
(2)
low time
pref.
(3)
low N
(4)
low
E{R}
(5)
high r
(6)
small
effect
Rate of time pref. (annual) 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
Mean risky rate (annual) 1.0782 1.0782 1.0782 1.0682 1.0782 1.0682
Mean riskless rate (annual) 1.0119 1.0119 1.0119 1.0119 1.0219 1.0219
Gn  bg 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633
G(n0) 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368
N = number of years per period 25 25 20 25 25 20
Propensity to consume, 1/(1+E)
(per N-year period)
0.5619 0.5000 0.5496 0.5619 0.5619 0.5000
Equity premium, [E{R} - r]/r
(per N-year period)
3.8870 3.8870 2.5582 2.8715 2.8218 1.4260
Effect on capital stock -0.58 -0.52 -0.37 -0.43 -0.42 -0.19
VII.  Concluding Remarks
The general equilibrium model developed in this paper shows that if the social
security system sells some bonds and purchases an equal amount of equity, the effect on
the aggregate capital stock is the sum of two terms.  The first term reflects the income
effect of middle-income consumers who benefit from the increased rate of return on
assets held in the portfolio of the social security system and have the resources to increase
their consumption when they are young.  In response to this increase in their effective
wealth, middle-income consumers increase their consumption, which reduces national
saving and capital accumulation.  The second term reflects the behavior of switchers who
                                                                                                                                                                            
different distribution of n and different values of n0 and   n.37
would have been indifferent about participating directly in the stock market before the
change in the social security system’s portfolio.  As a result of the social security system’s
holding of equity, these switchers would choose not to participate directly in the stock
market and thus would avoid paying the fixed cost of participating in that market.  With
the formulation of fixed costs in this model, avoiding the fixed costs induces switchers to
increase their saving, but this effect is not particularly robust.  To the extent that switchers
increase their saving, their response to the change in the social security system’s portfolio
works in the opposite direction of the response of middle-income consumers.
To study the quantitative impact on the aggregate capital stock of the change in
the social security system’s portfolio, I have chosen to ignore the behavior of switchers
for two reasons:  (1)  if I consider a change in the social security system after the current
generation of workers has already incurred the fixed cost of participating in the stock
market, they will not switch; and (2) under a reasonable alternative formulation, switchers
might reduce rather than increase their saving.  Ignoring switchers, I have shown that if
the social security system sells one dollar of bonds and buys one dollar of equity, the
aggregate capital stock would fall by a little more than a half dollar.  Of course, the
estimated effect on the aggregate capital stock would be reduced by taking account of
switchers, if they have not already incurred the fixed cost of stock market participation,
and if fixed costs are as modeled in this paper.  Future research is needed to explore the
potential quantitative importance of switchers.
Though the income effect on middle-income consumers, which is the driving
force behind the reduction in the aggregate capital stock, is very straightforward in this
model, it is important to consider factors that mitigate, or even reverse, this effect.  These38
factors could be usefully addressed in future research.  In the current model, middle-
income consumers would choose to hold a positive amount of risky capital if there were
no fixed costs.  Thus, when the trust fund of the social security system sells some bonds
in exchange for risky capital, these middle-income consumers regard themselves as better
off and increase their consumption when young.  However, if middle-income consumers
would choose to hold a negative amount of risky capital in the absence of fixed costs,
then they would reduce their consumption and increase their saving when the social
security trust fund sell bonds in exchange for risky capital.  High risk aversion alone
would not lead consumers to choose a negative amount of risky capital in this model,
because the equity premium on risky capital is positive, and there are no other risks in the
model.  But if consumers face other risks, such as homeownership or ownership interests
in small businesses, that are positively correlated with the return on risky capital, then
high risk aversion may lead consumers to choose a negative amount of risky capital in
their portfolios.
27
The logarithmic utility function in equation (10) has both an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution equal to one and a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to
one.  The unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution, together with the assumption
that consumers do not work when old, implies that saving does not depend on the interest
rate.  However, to the extent that an increase in the interest rate leads to an increase in
saving by consumers, the quantitative results in this paper will be mitigated or possibly
even reversed.  As discussed in the introduction, Diamond and Geanakoplos (1999) have
                                                          
27 A more general point is that the model does not contain a good reason for the institution of social
security.  Perhaps the inclusion of such a reason might alter the conclusions in this paper.  However, the39
analyzed a model that emphasizes the interest rate effect on saving, but their model has
no middle-income consumers and thus ignores the income effect emphasized in this
paper.
In this paper, I focused on the effect on aggregate capital accumulation, and for
the purpose of calibration, I matched the equity premium in the model with the empirical
average equity premium.  I did not attempt to explain the equity premium in terms of
fundamental preferences and technologies.  As is well known from the literature on the
equity premium puzzle, the unitary coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with
the logarithmic preferences in this paper is too low to account for the observed equity
premium.  I have presented, in footnote 5, a utility function that retains the unitary
intertemporal elasticity of substitution but has an arbitrary coefficient of relative risk
aversion.  The quantitative results presented in Table 2 continue to hold under this more
general utility function.  However, a higher coefficient of relative risk aversion will
increase the equilibrium equity premium and can help reduce the size of the fixed cost
necessary to prevent stock market participation by middle-income consumers.
There are various proposals to reform social security, and, no doubt, several new
proposals will appear.  I have chosen to focus not on a particular reform proposal, but
instead to focus on a particular feature—investing part of the trust fund in risky capital—
that is found in some proposals.  Proposals that include risky investment by the trust fund
include other aspects, such as guaranteed minimum benefits to retirees, that require
further study.  Nor have I addressed any corporate governance issues that might arise if
the social security system owned stock in private enterprises.  With these same caveats,
                                                                                                                                                                            
goal of this paper is simply to take the existence of social security as given and to analyze a specific change40
the analysis of this paper can also be applied to proposals that include individual accounts
without investment options for individuals.
To sharpen the analysis of the social security system’s portfolio, I have confined
attention to fully-funded, defined-contribution social security systems in which the shell
game argument is transparent.  However, the current social security system in the United
States is closer to a pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit plan.  In the fully-funded, defined-
contribution system analyzed in this paper, the current workers bear the risk associated
with next period’s risky return to equity held by the social security system.
28  However, in
a pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit system there is more scope for intergenerationally
sharing the risk associated with the return to capital held by the social security system.
                                                                                                                                                                            
in the way the trust fund is invested.
28 In a defined-benefit system, the additional investment income obtained by investing some of the trust
fund in higher-yielding risky capital rather than bonds accrues to young consumers in the form of lower
payroll taxes and hence higher disposable income.  Middle-income and high-income young consumers
would save part of the additional disposable income and consume part of it, and low-income consumers
would consume all of it.  Of course, in the period in which the social security system begins to invest in
risky capital, which is the focus of this paper, the effects would not yet be operative.  For an analysis of
risky trust fund investment in a defined-benefit system along a growth path in an overlapping generations
model with a representative agent in each generation, see Abel (1999).41
Appendix A
Optimal Bond Holdings by a Saver Who Does Not Participate in the Stock Market
The optimal value of b for a middle-income consumer, who saves but does not participate
in the stock market, is determined by differentiating equation (18) with respect to b, and
setting the derivative equal to zero to obtain
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It is helpful to define the following function
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Define b* as the value of b that satisfies f(b*, Tk, :, r) = 1, and note that b* satisfies the
first-order condition in equation (A.1).  Differentiating f(b, Tk, :, r) with respect to b and
Tk, and evaluating the derivatives at b = b* yields
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Note that f(b*, , :, r) = E(:-b*)/b*  so
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which is equation (19).  The derivatives in equations (A.3) – (A.4), evaluated at Tk = 0,
are
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Applying the implicit function theorem to f(b*, 0, :, r) = 1, and using equations (A.6) -
(A.7) yields equation (20) in the text.42
Appendix B
The Effect on the Aggregate Capital Stock of Investing a Small Amount of Social
Security in the Stock Market
The aggregate demand for bonds is
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D
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where the first term is the demand for bonds by low-income consumers, the second term
is the demand for bonds by middle-income consumers, and the third term is the demand
for bonds by high-income consumers.  Totally differentiate equation (B.1) with respect to
B
D, r, Tk, Tb, n0 and   n using equations (14), (20), and the fact that 
w
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obtain
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The supply of bonds, B, is fixed, and in equilibrium B
D = B.  Therefore, dB
D = 0 so that
equation (B.2) implies
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The aggregate demand for risky capital is
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Totally differentiate equation (B.7) with respect to K
D, r, Tk, and   n using equation (15),
and evaluate the expression at Tk = 0 to obtain
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Rewrite equation (B.8) using equations (B.4) and (B.3) to obtain
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Substitute equation (B.6) into equation (B.10) to obtain
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which implies equation (37) in the text.44
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